Authors: Matthew Marchant, Ph.D. Student, Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness



Jada Thompson, Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness



Ryan Loy, Assistant Professor and Extension Economist, Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness



Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), commonly called bird flu refers to the H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b strain of avian influenza, which was detected in the United States in 2022. The term “highly pathogenic” refers to the virus’s ability to spread quickly and destructively, killing more than 75% of birds it infects (World Organisation for Animal Health, 2026). Because the virus is so deadly in commercial poultry, best practice requires the depopulation of flocks in which the disease is detected. Primarily, this is the humane response, as the entire flock will perish if given enough time. Depopulation also stops the reproduction of the virus, protecting farmers, consumers, and the public. Additionally, it allows farmers to minimize down time, returning farms to production as soon as possible, after appropriate cleaning and disinfection. Though necessary, these population losses lead to economic consequences which extend well beyond just individual farms, contributing significantly to elevated egg prices (Mitchell et al., 2024).



Bird Flu in the Flyway



The U.S. poultry industry encountered H5N2 HPAI in 2014, which was mostly spread house-to-house through contaminated materials, trucks, and laborers. This prompted sweeping changes in biosecurity culture that still exist today. These changes, along with a single warm summer, helped to end the outbreak by June 2015. Since the 2022 introduction of a host-adapted H5N1 virus, poultry growers in the Mississippi Flyway have faced increased disease risk, despite the wide adoption of these enhanced biosecurity measures. This most recent outbreak has spread instead by external introduction, rather than in the same fashion as in 2014. In this case, “host-adapted” refers to the virus’s ability to persist in wild bird populations. Whereas previous HPAI events ravaged both poultry and wild birds, the current H5N1 2.3.4.4b classification is less likely to kill wild bird species (Patyk et al., 2023; Thompson et al., 2025). This means that waterfowl can become infected and still survive migration, spreading the disease across the flyway.



What is the Mississippi flyway?



Migratory birds follow predictable migratory corridors, called flyways. The Mississippi flyway is an economically important flyway, covering parts of more than fifteen states and two Canadian provinces which include commercial broiler, turkey, and egg production. Migratory fowl spend the warm summer months in the breeding grounds of the northern Midwest, leaving in the fall to ride cold fronts south towards over-wintering habitat in the Gulf States. For southern states like Arkansas and Louisiana, the regularity of this migration is a large source of off-farm income, as waterfowl hunters flock to the Mississippi Delta. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimates that migratory bird hunters in Arkansas spend nearly $300 million annually on lodging, equipment, food, and transportation, over the state’s 72-day waterfowl season (U.S. Fish &amp; Wildlife Service, 2022). Birds begin moving north again in the spring, often returning to the same breeding region year after year. Aside from its incredible biodiversity during migrations, the wetland habitat along the Mississippi River acts as a natural flood barrier year-round, holding surplus water as it drains towards the river.



Examining the geographic distribution of HPAI detections over time reveals a clear seasonal pattern that mirrors waterfowl migration. Figure 1 shows the number of detections, by county, for each month over the course of the outbreak. During the summer months, detections are sparse and concentrated in the northern reaches of the flyway, where birds spend the breeding season. As fall migration begins, HPAI’s geographic footprint expands southward, spanning nearly the entire flyway from October through May.



Figure 1: Mississippi Flyway HPAI Detections by Month, 2022-2025, with fitted latitudinal mean and IQR



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1298" height="1408" src="https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.32.2-1-1.png" alt="" class="wp-image-44551" srcset="https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.32.2-1-1.png 1298w, https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.32.2-1-1-944x1024.png 944w, https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.32.2-1-1-768x833.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1298px) 100vw, 1298px" /></figure>



What does this mean?



Understanding seasonality affords producers a predictable window each year to prepare before peak exposure periods arrive.



Before Peak Season



Inspect and repair perimeter fencing, netting, and housing gaps that could allow wildlife to access farm premises. Evaluate water and feed delivery systems to ensure they too are isolated from outside contact. Review all available extension publications, updating biosecurity protocols where necessary while maintaining coverage status with livestock indemnity programs. Conduct training and review these protocols with all farm workers and establish relationships with your veterinarian and state animal health officials before an emergency arises. Budget for increased biosecurity expenditures and most importantly, ensure you have a financial emergency plan, should you face depopulation.



During Peak Season



Vigilantly adhere to enhanced biosecurity protocols without exception. Monitor flocks closely for behavioral changes, decreased feed and water consumption, or sudden mortality. Limit all non-essential personnel traffic and enforce strict entry and exit biosecurity for all visitors and vehicles. Report any unusual mortality to your veterinarian or the USDA at 1-866-536-7593.



Year-Round



Stay current with USDA APHIS detection reports to understand active disease pressure in your region. Participate in state and federal livestock indemnity programs and know your coverage.



The Big Picture



A host-adapted virus in a migratory population means recurring seasonal risk for the foreseeable future. However, that seasonality also gives producers, researchers, and communities time to plan ahead. Understanding when and where the disease is likely to appear turns an unpredictable force into a manageable calendar of preparation and vigilance. Extension agents and agricultural educators can use these materials to help producers understand local risk windows and connect with available resources. Community preparedness, which begins at the farm level, remains the most effective tool available against this disease.



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



References



Mitchell, J. L., Thompson, J. M., &amp; Malone, T. (2024). Biological lags and market dynamics in vertically coordinated food supply chains: HPAI impacts on U.S. egg prices. Food Policy, 126, 102655. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2024.102655



Patyk, K. A., Fields, V. L., Beam, A. L., Branan, M. A., McGuigan, R. E., Green, A., Torchetti, M. K., Lantz, K., Freifeld, A., Marshall, K., &amp; Delgado, A. H. (2023). Investigation of risk factors for introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 infection among commercial turkey operations in the United States, 2022: A case-control study. Frontiers in Veterinary Science, 10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fvets.2023.1229071



Thompson, J. M., Patyk, K., Fields, V., Branan, M., Delgado, A., &amp; Roesler, K. (2025). Biosecurity investment impacts on highly pathogenic avian influenza control in United States commercial turkey operations. Preventive Veterinary Medicine, 244. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2025.106624



U.S. Fish &amp; Wildlife Service. (2022). Economic Analysis of the Migratory Bird Hunting Regulations for the 2022-2023 Season. U.S. Department of the Interior.



World Organisation for Animal Health. (2026). 10.4 Infection with Highly Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses. In Terrestrial Animal Health Code (33rd ed.).



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



Recommended citation format: Marchant, Matthew, Jada Thompson, and Ryan Loy. &#8220;<a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/bird-flu-on-the-move-understanding-seasonal-hpai-risk-in-the-mississippi-flyway/">Bird Flu on the Move: Understanding Seasonal HPAI Risk in the Mississippi Flyway.</a>&#8221; Southern Ag Today 6(32.2). August 4, 2026. <a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/bird-flu-on-the-move-understanding-seasonal-hpai-risk-in-the-mississippi-flyway/">Permalink</a>

Bird Flu on the Move: Understanding Seasonal HPAI Risk in the Mississippi Flyway

The U.S. row crop sector is currently under significant economic pressure. Lower commodity prices, high input costs, policy uncertainty, and ongoing trade disruptions have combined to create a challenging operating environment for producers. It is clear that all producers are currently facing a challenging farming environment. However, we also observe meaningful differences in outcomes and performance within this same difficult environment. Some farms remain relatively stable. Others experience severe financial stress. Some adjust quickly, while others struggle to respond.



Why? Traditional discussions of agricultural risk tend to focus on external shocks such as price volatility, drought, policy changes, or broader economic downturns. These factors certainly matter. They shape the environment in which farms operate. However, identical shocks do not produce identical outcomes. The difference is often not the shock itself, but the decisions that are made in response to uncertainty.



Risk, by itself, does not generate outcomes, decisions do. Between an external shock and its eventual outcome lies a chain of decision processes. Producers must recognize emerging risks, interpret available information, evaluate alternatives, and choose a course of action. These decisions ultimately shape whether a farm remains resilient or experiences distress.



Consider a decline in commodity prices. Two farms may face the same market conditions. Yet one farm may recognize the threat earlier, have stronger financial reserves, or possess better market information. Another may have limited flexibility or delayed responses. The result is different outcomes despite facing the same shock.



This perspective suggests a shift in risk management away from simply identifying threats. Equally important is understanding how individuals and organizations process uncertainty and transform information into action. Rather than asking only, “What risks exist?” we should also ask, “How are decisions made in the face of risks as well as when the shocks emerge?”



The future of agricultural risk management will not be determined solely by better tools available to producers, such as better forecasting tools, insurance products, policy tools, or market information systems. It will also depend on improving the decision processes that connect uncertainty to outcomes. In the next article, I will walk through what I call Liu’s 5Rs of Risk Management Model to explore how information systems, risk perception, behavioral factors, and structural constraints interact to shape real-world agricultural decisions and outcomes.



Figure 1. Same Risk, Different Outcomes: Where Is the Missing Link? (Designed with ChatGPT)



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="846" height="411" src="https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.32.1-1.png" alt="" class="wp-image-44549" srcset="https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.32.1-1.png 846w, https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.32.1-1-768x373.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 846px) 100vw, 846px" /></figure>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



Liu, Yangxuan. &#8220;<a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/agricultural-risk-is-not-a-shock-problemits-a-decision-problem/">Agricultural Risk Is Not a Shock Problem—It&#8217;s a Decision Problem.</a>&#8221; Southern Ag Today 6(32.1). August 3, 2026. <a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/agricultural-risk-is-not-a-shock-problemits-a-decision-problem/">Permalink</a>

Agricultural Risk Is Not a Shock Problem—It’s a Decision Problem

Most farmers and rural residents know that agricultural cooperatives are farmer-owned but don’t think much more about their structure or how they are financed. While all businesses are financed by a combination of debt and owner equity, there are fundamental differences in financing a cooperative relative to a typical investor-owned business.



Typical Business Financing is Separate from Operations



Most businesses in the U.S. are owned by one group of individuals, the investors, and do business with another group, the customers.&nbsp; Under this structure, it is logical to separate financing from operations. If the business is generating, or projected to generate, adequate profits, there should be a pool of outside investors willing to provide equity capital. This structure allows for business financing to be separate from operations and marketing.



Profits from typical businesses are returned to their owners and investors in the form of retained earnings, dividends, and stock buy-backs. Those profit distributions create the incentive for equity investment. Customers of these businesses (who are not investors) do not receive a share of the profits.



Cooperative Financing is Combined with Operations



Under the cooperative business model, cooperative customers are also owners. Due to this structure, identifying financing for a new cooperative cannot be separated from the process of identifying its customers. New cooperative organizers must simultaneously identify individuals to be both cooperative users and investors and established cooperatives must obtain all the capital they need for future expansion through their user-investors.



Cooperatives distribute profits to its owner-customers in proportion to use. Therefore, there is no direct benefit from owning equity in a cooperative, rather the rationale for equity ownership is related to the use of the cooperative. In traditional, open membership cooperatives, a portion of the profits are distributed in the form of equity, often called “stock patronage”.&nbsp; That equity is typically redeemed into cash by the cooperative at a later date and is thus referred to as “revolving equity”.&nbsp; Under this cooperative structure, equity ownership is accumulated as a by-product of using the cooperative. In other situations, such as processing cooperatives which are more capital intensive, the cooperative stock is combined with a usage right.&nbsp; Under that structure the equity investment is a prerequisite to use.



Understanding Cooperative Equity Financing



Agricultural cooperatives are an important part of our rural landscape, with many of our legacy cooperatives having been in business for over 100 years. Understanding cooperative structures for acquiring and managing equity is key for continuing the cooperative business model. Merging the roles of users and investors has major implications for cooperative operations and planning. Groups who are interested in forming a cooperative must not only analyze the customer base, but they must also determine whether potential customers are interested in investing in a user-owned business. Established cooperatives must create systems to match use and investment on a long-term basis.



Having two stakeholder groups, investors and customers, sounds complicated while merging those two groups sounds simple.&nbsp; In reality, the ownership element of the cooperative business model is more complicated relative to other firms.&nbsp; Agricultural cooperatives create great benefits in keeping markets competitive and improving the financial results of their farmer-owners.&nbsp; I view cooperatives as a better, but not necessarily simpler, business structure.



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



Kenkel, Phil. &#8220;<a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/what-is-different-about-financing-a-cooperative/">What is Different About Financing a Cooperative?</a>&#8221; Southern Ag Today 6(31.5). July 31, 2026. <a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/what-is-different-about-financing-a-cooperative/">Permalink</a>

What is Different About Financing a Cooperative?

Authors: K. Aleks Schaefer and Rylee Smith



Last week, the USDA announced it would resume Mexican cattle imports under a phased reopening beginning in August. This is a somewhat controversial, but scientifically sound choice. When the United States suspended imports of live cattle from Mexico, the objective was straightforward: keep New World Screwworm (NWS) out of the country for as long as possible. The policy accepted significant economic costs in exchange for delaying one of the livestock industry&#8217;s most damaging pests.



That question looks very different today. With NWS now confirmed inside the United States (USDA APHIS, 2026), policymakers are no longer deciding whether the border closures prevent introduction; they are deciding whether the restrictions provide enough benefit to justify their economic costs. Our previous research estimated the economic cost of the border closures and how much delay in pest establishment would be required for those costs to be worthwhile (Sumner et al., 2026). Those findings provide a framework for evaluating today&#8217;s policy debate.



Border Closures Significantly Tightened Feeder Cattle Supplies: Mexico has long served as one of the largest suppliers of feeder cattle to U.S. feedlots, with roughly 1.2 million head imported annually before the restrictions (Sumner et al., 2026). When the border closed, those cattle disappeared from the market. At the largest point of disruption, monthly imports were more than 150,000 head below what historical market relationships would have predicted (Sumner et al., 2026).



Feeder Cattle Prices Climbed Well Above Expected Levels: With fewer feeder cattle entering the United States, domestic supplies tightened quickly. Our analysis shows that the border closures pushed feeder cattle prices much higher than expected. Prices initially followed normal market trends but increased rapidly, reaching nearly $100 per hundredweight above what would have been expected by July 2025 (Sumner et al., 2026).



Border closures put substantial upward pressure on feeder cattle prices. Changes in Mexican cattle imports had lasting effects on feeder cattle prices, demonstrating how closely U.S. and Mexican cattle markets are connected (Sumner et al., 2026).



Figure 1. Impacts of the import ban on U.S. Feeder Cattle Markets



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1328" height="520" src="https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.31.4.png" alt="" class="wp-image-44532" srcset="https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.31.4.png 1328w, https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.31.4-1024x401.png 1024w, https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.31.4-768x301.png 768w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1328px) 100vw, 1328px" /><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Source: Authors&#8217; calculations using LMIC and USDA AMS data.</figcaption></figure>



With confirmed cases of New World Screwworm now detected within the United States (USDA APHIS, 2026), policymakers face a different decision. The question is no longer whether the border can keep the pest out entirely, but whether continued restrictions on Mexican cattle imports meaningfully slow its spread, reduce the likelihood of reinfestation from neighboring regions, or provide enough additional time for response efforts to outweigh the ongoing costs on the cattle industry.



Over nine months, the border closures reduced feeder cattle imports, tightened supplies, and increased feeder cattle prices (Sumner et al., 2026). Those impacts continue to accumulate with restrictions in place.



Policymakers must weigh the market disruptions against the biosecurity benefits that the restrictions provide. If the remaining benefits are limited, the economic case for prolonged border closures becomes weaker. If, however, the restrictions significantly reduce additional introductions, protect infestation-free regions, or improve the effectiveness of eradication efforts, continued restrictions may still generate benefits.



Biosecurity policies are rarely static. As conditions change, so should the economic questions used to evaluate them. The challenge is no longer asking &#8220;Did the border closure buy enough time?&#8221; It is asking &#8220;How much additional protection does the closure provide today and is that protection worth its continuing economic cost?&#8221;



REFERENCES



Sumner S., Jones S., Islam T., and Schaefer K.A. (2026) “Delaying the Inevitable? U.S. Screwworm Closures and Feeder Cattle Market Dynamics,” Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.70111">https://doi.org/10.1002/aepp.70111</a>.



USDA APHIS.&nbsp;2026.&nbsp;“Confirmed Detections of New World Screwworm.”&nbsp;<a href="https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animals/animal-health/livestock-and-poultry-disease/current-status/us-confirmed-cases-new-world">https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animals/animal-health/livestock-and-poultry-disease/current-status/us-confirmed-cases-new-world</a>.



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



Recommended citation format: Schaefer, K. Aleks, and Rylee Smith. &#8220;<a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/reopening-the-border-to-mexican-cattle-imports-is-the-right-decision/">Reopening the Border to Mexican Cattle Imports is the Right Decision.</a>&#8221; Southern Ag Today 6(31.4). July 30, 2026. <a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/reopening-the-border-to-mexican-cattle-imports-is-the-right-decision/">Permalink</a>

Reopening the Border to Mexican Cattle Imports is the Right Decision

Authors: William E. Maples and Adam Rabinowitz



When choosing where and when to deliver grain, producers often first focus on the posted price. However, the highest posted price may not always result in the highest net return. Grain moisture, buyer discounts, delivery distance, fuel costs, labor, and wait times can all affect the final value of a load. Here we discuss the impact of delivery decisions on the final price of grains.&nbsp;



Grain Moisture



Most corn and soybean buyers use a standard moisture level when purchasing grain. Corn is commonly priced at 15 percent moisture, while soybeans are typically priced at 13 percent moisture. Grain delivered above the standard moisture level is generally subject to a discount because wetter grain contains more water and less marketable dry matter. However, delivering grain below the standard moisture level can also reduce producer returns because the additional dry matter is typically sold without receiving a premium or an adjustment in the number of bushels delivered.



Figure 1 illustrates the effect of corn moisture on revenue using an assumed moisture discount schedule and a base price of $4.50 per bushel. At 16 percent moisture, the producer would receive a moisture discount of approximately 9 cents per bushel, reducing the effective price to $4.41 per bushel. As moisture increases, the discount becomes larger. At 18 percent moisture, the estimated discount increases to approximately 29 cents per bushel, reducing the effective price to $4.21 per bushel.



Moisture levels below 15 percent also affect revenue, although the loss does not appear as a direct discount for the producer. In this example, delivering corn at 14 percent moisture instead of 15 percent results in a loss of approximately 5 cents per bushel. The lower-moisture corn contains more dry matter per delivered bushel, but the producer is still paid based on the same standard bushel weight. Therefore, the additional dry matter is delivered without additional compensation.



Distance and Wait Times



Delivery distance and elevator wait time can also affect which grain buyer provides the highest net return. Table 1 compares several delivery scenarios that differ by distance and unloading time. As expected, total delivery cost increases as distance increases. In this example, Buyer 1 is located 10 miles away, while Buyer 4 is 25 miles away. Delivering to Buyer 4 costs approximately 10 cents more per bushel than delivering to Buyer 1.



Although Buyer 1 has a longer wait time of 30 minutes compared with 10 minutes for Buyer 4, the added waiting cost is smaller than the transportation cost associated with the additional distance. This suggests that distance is the primary driver of delivery cost in the example. However, wait time still matters, especially during harvest when delays can reduce the number of loads moved in a day and can increase the potential for weather related losses. Producers should consider total delivery time, including both travel and unloading, rather than focusing on either factor alone.



Alternative Delivery Times



An alternative to delivery at harvest involves the storage of grain, but this isn’t always the best answer either.&nbsp;&nbsp;Previous&nbsp;Southern Ag Today&nbsp;articles have discussed both the flexibility that storage can provide, as well as the additional costs for extra drying, shrinkage, quality deterioration, and additional handling (Duncan and Smith 2022; Maples 2022).&nbsp;&nbsp;However, on-farm storage is generally limited in the southern region (Pittman and Rabinowitz 2025). Producers can then consider delayed pricing contracts, commercial storage, and re-ownership positions (Smith 2022). Thus, several options can exist to delay delivery for an expected better price, but these also must be carefully evaluated.



The combination of moisture, delivery costs, and delivery timing can make a difference for producers when comparing prices of delivered grains. The bottom line is to look past the posted price and make sure to consider the other options and associated costs when deciding where and when to market the grain.



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1894" height="1423" src="https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.31.3-1.png" alt="" class="wp-image-44520" srcset="https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.31.3-1.png 1894w, https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.31.3-1-1024x769.png 1024w, https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.31.3-1-768x577.png 768w, https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.31.3-1-1536x1154.png 1536w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1894px) 100vw, 1894px" /></figure>



Table 1. Estimated transportation costs and net price across four grain buyers



<figure class="wp-block-table is-style-stripes has-small-font-size"><table><tbody><tr><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Buyer</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">One-way distance (miles)</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Wait &amp; unload time (minutes)</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Fuel cost (¢/bu)</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Truck overhead (¢/bu)</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Labor cost (¢/bu)</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Total delivery cost (¢/bu)</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Posted price ($/bu)</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Price less delivery cost (4/bu)</td></tr><tr><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Buyer 1</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">10</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">30</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">1.40</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">4.80</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">1.24</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">7.45</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">$4.50</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">$4.43</td></tr><tr><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Buyer 2</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">15</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">10</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">2.11</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">7.20</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">1.10</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">10.40</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">$4.50</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">$4.40</td></tr><tr><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Buyer 3</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">20</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">5</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">2.81</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">9.60</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">1.28</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">13.69</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">$4.50</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">$4.36</td></tr><tr><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">Buyer 4</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">25</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">10</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">3.51</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">12.00</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">1.68</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">17.19</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">$4.50</td><td class="has-text-align-center" data-align="center">$4.33</td></tr></tbody></table><figcaption class="wp-element-caption">Assumptions:&nbsp;Fuel price of $4.00 per gallon, truck capacity of 950 bushels, fuel efficiency of 6 miles per gallon, fixed truck cost of $1.74 per mile, repair and tire cost of $0.54 per mile, and transportation costs based on a round trip.&nbsp;</figcaption></figure>



References:



Duncan, Hence, and S. Aaron Smith. “Estimating the Cost of a Grain Bagging System“.&nbsp;Southern Ag Today&nbsp;2(31.3). July 27, 2022. <a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2022/07/estimating-the-cost-of-a-grain-bagging-system/">https://southernagtoday.org/2022/07/estimating-the-cost-of-a-grain-bagging-system/</a>



Maples, William E. “On-Farm Grain Storage in Southern States“.&nbsp;Southern Ag Today&nbsp;2(38.1). September 12, 2022.&nbsp;<a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2022/09/on-farm-grain-storage-in-southern-states/">https://southernagtoday.org/2022/09/on-farm-grain-storage-in-southern-states/</a>



Pittman, Wilton, and Adam Rabinowitz. “Marketing Challenges from Storage Capacity and Excess Supply.”&nbsp;Southern Ag Today&nbsp;5(36.3). September 3, 2025.&nbsp;<a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2025/09/03/marketing-challenges-from-storage-capacity-and-excess-supply/">https://southernagtoday.org/2025/09/03/marketing-challenges-from-storage-capacity-and-excess-supply/</a>



Smith, S. Aaron. “<a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2022/09/marketing-strategies-if-producers-do-not-have-access-to-on-farm-storage/">Marketing Strategies if Producers Do Not Have Access to On-Farm Storage.</a>” Southern Ag Today 2(40.1). September 26, 2022. https://southernagtoday.org/2022/09/26/marketing-strategies-if-producers-do-not-have-access-to-on-farm-storage/



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



Recommended citation format: Maples, William E., and Adam Rabinowitz. &#8220;<a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/considerations-when-making-grain-delivery-decisions/">Considerations When Making Grain Delivery Decisions</a>.&#8221; Southern Ag Today 6(31.3). July 29, 2026. <a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/considerations-when-making-grain-delivery-decisions/">Permalink</a>

Considerations When Making Grain Delivery Decisions

Two key reports were released on Friday that provide new insights into cattle herd dynamics and feedlot inventories. USDA-NASS published the mid-year Cattle Inventory report and the monthly Cattle on Feed report. Notably, this is the second consecutive year for the July Cattle Inventory report. It was one of several reports USDA-NASS suspended in 2024 due to budget constraints. Overall, the July report showed a small increase in total cattle inventories, increasing by 200 thousand head from 94.0 million in 2025 to 94.2 million in 2026.



For me, one of the bigger surprises was the 2026 beef cow estimate. USDA estimates July 2026 beef cow inventories at 28.45 million head, down 1%, or 200 thousand head. Most were expecting to see a slight increase in beef cow numbers. One of the main factors to look at before this report is released is January through June beef cow slaughter as a percent of January beef cow inventories. In 2026, through June, beef cow slaughter totaled 1.02 million head, or 3.7% of January beef cow inventories. That is the lowest slaughter rate going back to the 1980s.



The 2026 calf crop is estimated at 32.5 million head, 2.0% smaller than the 2025 calf crop. This total includes 23.9 million calves born in the first half of the year and an expected 8.6 million to be born in the second half. If realized, this will be a very small calf crop and would set us up for further declines in beef production.



Most were looking to this report for signs of herd expansion. One variable to look at is the number of beef replacement heifers. NASS estimated 3.8 million beef heifers held for replacement, a 3.0% increase from last year. This is only an increase of 100 thousand head. We are still a long way away from beef replacement heifer numbers that would signal widespread herd expansion. Drought is still limiting that from happening.



The July Cattle on Feed report also includes the number of heifers on feed, which allows us to calculate their share of total feedlot inventories. In July 2026, heifers on feed were estimated at 4.25 million head, accounting for 37.4% of total feedlot inventories. This is down from 38.1% in July 2025. For context, in 2015, heifers made up just 32.5% of feedlot inventories.



Overall, the July cattle inventory report is bullish, though I suspect much of the news in the report will be overshadowed by news last week that the U.S. will begin a phased reopening of the southern border to allow imports of feeder cattle. I’m sure there will be lots of opinions about that development that will influence markets this week.&nbsp;



<figure class="wp-block-image size-full"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="479" height="306" src="https://sat-wp.afpc.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/6.31.2.png" alt="" class="wp-image-44514"/></figure>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



Recommended citation format: Mitchell, James. &#8220;<a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/where-did-the-cows-go/">Where did the Cows Go?</a>&#8221; Southern Ag Today 6(31.2). July 28, 2026. <a href="https://southernagtoday.org/2026/07/27/where-did-the-cows-go/">Permalink</a>

Explore Daily Topics

Collaborating Universities